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TITLE TO ACCRUED VACATION PAY: THE
BANKRUPT'S OR THE TRUSTEE'S
IN BANKRUPTCY?
The two fundamental purposes of the Bankruptcy Act' are to
liquidate and distribute assets of the debtor in a manner which is
"equitable to the debtor, to the creditor, and among the creditors";2
and to "leave the bankrupt free after the date of his petition to accu-
mulate new wealth in the future."' 3  To carry out these objectives the
act specifies the date of bankruptcy as a general time-pivotal or point
of cleavage throughout its provisions. Section 70a provides that as of
the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee of the estate of a bank-
rupt shall be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt
to all classes of property enumerated in its subdivisions, but that the
bankrupt shall be free of creditors' claims to property acquired there-
after.4 Of the eight separate classes of properties, interests or rights
which may come into the estate in bankruptcy as assets and thereby
vest in the trustee, the most general classification is that created by the
fifth clause.5
This clause, subject to provisos as to certain rights of action for
wrongs to the person and as to life insurance policies, vests the trustee
with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy to
property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of
the petition [the bankrupt] could by any means have transferred
or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded or seques-
tered . 6
By fixing a definite time when the estate of the bankrupt is con-
sidered subject to the act-and thereby delineating the rights and status
of those claiming against the estate-the two underlying themes of
equality of distribution and rehabilitation of the debtor have been con-
sistently maintained. But no matter how suitable the date of bank-
ruptcy might be as a means of maintaining and harmonizing these two
goals, there will still be conflicting claims to specific forms of property
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964).
2. 3 J. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.01 (14th ed. J. Moore & L
King, 1962) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
3. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
4. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964); 4A COLLIER 70.07.
5. 3 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 1177-269 (J. Henderson ed. 1957).
6. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § I10(a)(5) (1964).
involving both present and future interests which do not fall neatly on
either side of the cleavage point. Such a conflict arose as to title to a
wage earner's accrued and unpaid vacation pay in Frederick v. Lines.
7
In Lines two wage earners, Frederick and Harris, filed separate
petitions in bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California during 1967. Lines was appointed
trustee of the bankrupts' estates in both proceedings at the First Meet-
ing of Creditors.8 Sometime thereafter the trustee filed an Applica-
tion for Turnover Order, alleging that he was entitled to receive as an
asset of the bankrupts' estates that portion of the appellants' accrued
vacation allowance earned as of the date of filing.9 After hearings
before the referee in bankruptcy, the bankrupts were ordered to turn
over to the trustee the unexempt portion of their vacation pay earned
as of the bankruptcy date at such future time as each received that
pay.
10
The facts stipulated on appeal indicated that the two cases were
quite similar. Both appellants were California residents and derived
their support from wages. The only significant difference between the
two cases was the manner in which the two employers handled vaca-
tion pay. Appellant Frederick's employer, a large manufacturer, gave
"vacation" with full pay during plant closings which occurred for a
week twice each year, once during summer and again at year's end.
Employees could not draw vacation pay until plant closings unless ear-
lier terminated. Appellant Harris' employer, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, used a voluntary vacation plan rather than the compulsory
layoff plan as provided for in the case of appellant Frederick. Under
the voluntary plan employees could not draw vacation pay until they
took a vacation or were earlier terminated. Both employers had cred-
ited vacation pay on account in amounts which were similar.11
Upon these stipulated facts the district court denied the appel-
lants' petition to review the turnover orders of the referee in bank-
ruptcy. From the order of the district court the appellants appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appellants contended
7. 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.), affd, 91 S. Ct. 113 (1970).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 44a, 11 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1964), provides that the creditors
of a bankrupt shall at first meeting of creditors appoint a trustee. Although it is not
permissible to appoint a "general trustee" to act in a certain class of cases, it is proper
for courts to allow the same trustee to administer cases of a similar nature on the
basis of its power to control the appointment of trustees. Compare GENERAL ORDER
iN BANKRupTcY 14 with Bankruptcy Act § 2a(17), 11 U.S.C. § II(a)(17) (1964).
9. Brief for Appellant at 2, Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970).
Bankruptcy Act § 2a(21). 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(21) (1964), provides for the turnover
order.
10. Record, vol. 1, at 51, Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970).
11. 425 F.2d at 216.
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first of all that the claimed vacation pay was not "property" as defined
by section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act and therefore was not subject to
bankruptcy administration. 2 Secondly, the appellants argued that
the referee's order violated equitable principles which govern adminis-
tration of the Bankruptcy Act. Such an order, so the argument ran,
denied appellants a "fresh start" and imposed hardship on the bank-
rupts without affording any compensating benefit to the creditors. 3
In their brief, appellants first maintained that accrued vacation
pay was "nothing more than an internal bookkeeping entry made by
the employer[s] for [their] own purpose[s]" which, unless certain fu-
ture events occurred, "remain[ed] as lifeless and inert as the printed
numerical characters" in which form it existed.' 4 In sharp contrast
to appellants' characterization, the trustee-appellee contended:
The bankrupt has a vested right in the vacation pay accrued and
earned at the date of bankruptcy; . . . the enjoyment of vacation
pay may be postponed, but the bankrupt[s'] right[s] to it [are]
fixed at the time of bankruptcy when it had accrued in [their]
favor.' 5
Secondly, appellants contended that
[o]ne of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and
permit him to start afresh. .. 21
and that as a matter of equity the referee's order "would create injus-
tice and unfairness by depriving appellant[s] and [their families] of
wages needed to support them. . .. "17 The appellee countered that
the real basis of the "fresh start" was the benefit the bankrupt obtained
through discharge of his debts; that "[i]t is the right and duty of the
trustee to collect and marshall all assets of the bankrupt"; and that
therefore there was no hardship since "[a]ppellant[s] must relinquish
[all] assets . . . whether or not the asset is subject to immediate enjoy-
ment or physical receipt."' 8
The final argument of the appellants was that in return for impos-
ing hardship on the bankrupts, the referee's order offered almost no
compensating benefit to the creditors. To support this contention, ap-
pellants offered statistics which showed that nonbusiness wage earner
12. Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief].
13. Id. at 7-11.
14. id. at 4.
15. Brief for Appellee at 3, Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Appellee's Brief].
16. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934), quoting Williams v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1914).
17. Appellant's Brief 9.
18. Appellee's Brief 3.
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bankruptcy proceedings had offered dividends to creditors in only one
out of nine cases.19
The Ninth Circuit unanimously accepted the appellants' conten-
tions and reversed the district court's order. The court reasoned that
an asset could not be deemed "property" for the purposes of section
70a(5) "if a transfer of that asset to the trustee interferes with the
bankrupt's freedom after the date of his petition to accumulate new
wealth."20  Since vacation pay was analogous to future wages, which
do not constitute "property" at the time of bankruptcy, the court con-
cluded that vacation pay credited to the employees' accounts before
bankruptcy was also not "property" within 70a(5). As Judge Huf-
stedler noted,
The overriding reason for [this] view is that an employee who
will be without wages or on reduced wages during future layoffs
or who will be without a vacation cannot be said to have been
given the fresh start Congress intended him to have.
21
To support its decision the court relied on Segal v. Rochelle,22 and
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer28 while disapproving contrary
views in Kolb v. Berlin,24 In re Cohen,25 and In re Keuther. 6
Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Case Authority
A close examination of the supporting cases reveals that they are
distinguishable on their facts from Lines. In Kinzer, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's principal authority, an appeal was taken from a judgment that
vacation pay standing to the credit of a bankrupt passed to the trustee.
At the time of bankruptcy the employee in this case had no interest or
right which he could enforce or transfei or which his creditors could
reach. In order to receive vacation pay the bankrupt, as an employee
of Tennessee Valley Authority, had to comply with a federal statute
covering employees of corporations created under authority of Con-
gress.2 7 The vacation pay or annual leave was earned for all days an
employee was in a pay status, regardless of whether he was actually
on duty or on leave of absence with pay.28 However, the annual leave
did not accrue until the employee was on "terminal leave"; that is, on
19. Appellant's Brief 9.
20. 425 F.2d at 217.
21. Id.
22. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
23. 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944).
24. 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
25. 276 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
26. 203 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
27. 142 F.2d at 838.
28. Id.
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annual leave taken immediately prior to final separation from em-
ploy.29 Moreover, there were numerous contingencies, upon the hap-
pening of which the employee would not receive his pay during leave
of absence, including employment with other federal agencies during
his period of leave, misconduct or participation in political activity.3 0
As described by the court in Kinzer,
Vacation pay was not due the bankrupt, or earned by him, prior
to bankruptcy. He had only earned the right to such pay, at a
subsequent period, provided that he continued in the employ of the
Authority, in a duty status, during the time the pay accrued; he
could not have received it unless he took the leave; he would
not have been entitled to it, after his separation from service,
whether he had otherwise earned the right to it or not; and, in
any case, it was dependent on various contingencies. 3
1
In summary, Kinzer is factually distinguishable from the present case
because the bankrupt's right to receive accumulated pay had not ac-
crued as of the date of bankruptcy and was wholly dependent upon
contingencies, several of which might have deprived the bankrupt of
his accumulated vacation pay altogether. 2
In Segal v. Rochelle13 voluntary petitions in bankruptcy were filed
in a Texas federal court by the two Segal brothers, Sam and Gerald,
and their partnership, Segal Cotton Products. During the year prior
to bankruptcy the partnership had suffered severe losses. Because of
the losses the trustee sought and obtained loss-carryback tax refunds
from the United States on behalf of the Segals under Internal Revenue
Code section 172.11 These losses were carried back to offset net in-
come on which the Segals had both paid taxes in prior years. By
agreement the trustee placed the tax refunds in a special account; the
Segals applied to the referee in bankruptcy to award the refunds to
them on the ground that bankruptcy had not passed the refund claims
to the trustee. The primary question for the Court on appeal was
whether loss-carryback refunds constituted property within the mean-
ing of 70a(5). The Court held that it was property, reasoning that
the loss-carryback refund was
sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little en-
tangled with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered
fresh start that it should be [so] regarded.
35




32. See also In re Palifika, 42 REF. J. 126, 127 (1968).
33. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
34. Id. at 376.
35. Id. at 380.
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Temporally, two key elements pointing towards realization of a
refund existed at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed: taxes
had been paid on net income within the past three years, and the
year of bankruptcy at that point exhibited a net operating loss.3 6
In Lines the only fact which could connect vacation pay with the pre-
bankruptcy past is the accrual of that pay. If accrual were clearly es-
tablished as being in the past, Lines and Segal would be analogous.
However, since accrual in the past is not definitely established in
Lines, the facts of Segal, if not distinguishable, at least demonstrate a
stronger nexus with the past than do the facts of Lines.
Contrary Authority
In order to analyze the result in Lines objectively, it is necessary
to discuss briefly the authorities that the court cited but disapproved.
The three cases-Kolb,37 Cohen3s and Keuther39 -upon which the dis-
trict court and the appellee placed heavy emphasis in Lines seem con-
trary to the Ninth Circuit's position in the latter case. Keuther appears
to be the first reported case to hold that vacation pay was property
subject to bankruptcy administration. In that case review was sought
of a referee's order denying the trustee's petition for directions that the
bankrupt turn over to him vacation pay which she had earned at the
time of the filing of her petition and which she subsequently received.
At the time of filing the bankrupt had been employed as a waitress a
few days short of 2 years.40 Her union's contract provided:
After a regular or relief employee has been in the service of an
employer for twenty-four (24) months, he shall be entitled to
two (2) week's [sic] vacation with pay [which] shall be the
average weekly pay received by such employee during the year
preceding the vacation. When employment is severed, an em-
ployee shall be entitled to vacation pay prorated according to
the actual weeks of work and upon the basis of two (2) weeks
[sic] pay. ... 41
The court held that immediately prior to the filing of the petition
the bankrupt was vested with an absolute right to receive the pro-
rated portion of two weeks' vacation pay. Since the right of the bank-
rupt was not dependent on any contingency and she was certain to re-
ceive payment by the end of the 2 years or sooner in the event of an
earlier termination of her employment, this was a property right and
title to such vacation pay passed to the trustee.42  Although Keuther
36. Id.
37. Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966).
38. In re Cohen, 276 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
39. In re Keuther, 203 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
40. Id. at 223.
41. Id. at 223-24.
42. Id. at 224.
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appears quite similar to Lines, it dealt only with the question whether
vacation pay was "property" within 70a(5) as a matter of law. Since
it disregarded the equitable matter of providing a "new opportunity in
life and clear field for the future, . ." the Keuther opinion lacks
the comprehensiveness of Segal and is severely weakened by that case.
Both Kolb and Cohen are similar to Keuther on their facts and
both rely so heavily on that decision that a detailed factual exposition
would not aid the present inquiry. Each decision is, as aptly suggested
by the appellant in Lines, a "classic case of 'judicial bootstrapping' origi-
nating from a highly questionable case."44
In summary it appears that the Ninth Circuit's holding may not in
fact find support in the cases it cites as authority. It seems, paradox-
ically, that the disapproved cases are more akin to the fact situation in
Lines. Before condemning this seemingly illogical result, however, it
is necessary to determine what factors went into Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion.
A Case for the Bankrupt
In reaching a conclusion contrary to that reached in prior cases
by two district courts and other courts of appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
lied heavily on the ratio decidendi of Segal. That decision identified
the competing policy considerations that underlie a determination of
what constitutes property for purposes of 70a(5):
The main thrust of 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of
value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when
he files his petition. To this end the term "property" has been
construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach
because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be
postponed. . . . However, limitations on the term property do
grow out of other purposes of the Act; one purpose which is
highly prominent . . . is to leave the bankrupt free after the date
of his petition to accumulate new wealth in the future.45
By holding that 70a(5) does not include accrued vacation pay, the
Ninth Circuit attempted to strike a balance between these competing
purposes. What is not evident, however, are the considerations that
went into the court's balancing process, considerations which may rec-
oncile the conflicting decisions.
One question facing the court was whether the particular interest
involved-accrued but unpaid vacation pay-could be regarded as
"property" as a matter of law. This inquiry is wholly distinguishable
43. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1933); accord, Stellwagon v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
44. Appellants Brief, supra note 12, at 12.
45. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
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from the question whether such an interest should be so regarded for
bankruptcy purposes. The distinction is that the latter -question in-
volves both matters of law and equity while the former only involves
the narrow issue of whether the statutory language of 70a indicates a
clear intent to exclude the interest from the trustee's control. The pur-
pose of the enumeration in 70a is an exclusionary one; if the interest
is clearly outside the ambit of that section, the trustee cannot gain title
no matter what equitable considerations are present. In other words,
the numerous subdivisions and provisos of 70a give rise to a negative
implication that any interest not listed is not to pass to the trustee.46
Under 70a(5), the guiding criterion is transferability or leviabil-
ity.47 If the particular interest is subject to sale or judicial process,
then it may be regarded as property. But even if the interest passes
this test, other relevant considerations may dictate that it should not be
so regarded. In early cases such as Kinzer, the initial criterion-trans-
ferability-was the sole concern of the courts.48 By overemphasizing
the statutory language of section 70a, the courts became caught in a
semantic tangle and lost sight of relevant equitable factors. Decisions
in similar cases began to go both ways with anomalous and irreconci-
lable results.49 Lines, by contrast, deferred the question of transfer-
ability until after the equitable matters were examined. The ultimate
result was that the Ninth Circuit in Lines found it unnecessary to de-
cide whether, under California law, either bankrupt could have trans-
ferred his right to receive vacation pay or whether creditors could have
reached those expectancies. 50 It is fairly certain, however, from both
the statutes and decisions cited by counsel that the court would have
decided that vacation pay was both transferable and leviable and there-
fore within the ambit of 70a(5).51
The primary concern of the Ninth Circuit was whether the bank-
rupts' interests in accrued unpaid vacation pay should be regarded as
"property" within section 70a. Involved here are equitable matters.
These may be divided into three separate points, each of which was ar-
46. 4A COLLIER 70.09.
47. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 12 (1924).
48. In re Coleman, 87 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1937); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
v. Stewart, 12 F. Supp. 186, 192-93 (W.D.S.C. 1935).
49. Compare Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944),
with In re Willow Cafeterias, 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
50. Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1970).
51. Medical Ass'n v. Rambo, 33 Cal. App. 2d 756 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1938); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 690.6. Although Rambo deals with earnings and not
with vacation pay, the decision would support a finding that vacation pay is transferable
in California because, as the Ninth Circuit stated, "[V]acation pay is analogous to
future wages." Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1970).
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gued52 and carefully considered by the court in Lines." They are:
1) hardship to the debtor, 2) benefit to the creditors and 3) feasibil-
ity of administration.
The hardship factor. Once the court has determined that the in-
terest in question may fairly be regarded as the trustee's property un-
der the transferability test, it must decide whether an overriding hard-
ship to the debtor is thereby created. This was the Supreme Court's
major concern in Segal. It is a matter of equity for which no precise
test can be stated. Basically, the question is whether the turnover or-
der will create injustice and unfairness by depriving the bankrupt of a
resource needed to support the bankrupt and his family. If it is found
that such deprivation will render the rehabilitative purpose of the act
ineffective, the order should be denied whether or not the interest falls
within 70a(5) under the transferability test. This is the meaning of
Segal and the holding of Lines.
The benefit factor. Secondly, the court must carefully determine
whether the creditors will materially benefit by having the assets in-
clude the particular interest. One measure of this benefit is a compar-
ison of transfer value and costs of administration. If the saleability is
negligible so that the transfer value will be entirely consumed by fees
and costs of administration, then the interest should not pass to the
trustee. Since this is generally the case with respect to accrued vaca-
tion pay interests, the court should carefully analyze this consideration.
The court in Lines did so, and stated that "[i]n reaching [our] con-
clusion. . . we are mindful that a contrary view would rarely benefit
creditors."5'
The feasibility factor. The third factor that a court must con-
sider is the feasibility of bankruptcy administration. A rule developed
by the courts with respect to section 70a permits a trustee to refuse to
administer burdensome assets. While the matter is generally left to
the trustee's discretion, the courts retain jurisdiction to supervise the
exercise of this discretion. Considerable time may elapse before the
order can be carried out, causing the court to keep a bankrupt's estate
open for an excessive length of time. In most cases trusts continuing
after the close of the estate would be impractical from the standpoint
of expense. Although this is certainly not the paramount considera-
tion, every increase in the length of administration of an estate defeats
both the purpose of maximum distribution and the purpose of freeing
the bankrupt from the burden of the bankruptcy proceeding itself.
This was clearly recognized by the court in Lines:
52. Appellant's Brief, supra note 12, at 7-11.
53. 425 F.2d at 216-17.
54. 425 F.2d at 217.
[Vol. 22
Instead of benefiting bankruptcy administration . . . such funds,
when, if ever received by the employee would usually be consumed
by the expenses of administration incurred to keep the estate open
awaiting the employee's vacation or his unemployment.5
Conclusion
What initially appeared to be an irreconcilable conflict between
courts of appeals may not be a conflict at all. Throughout the deci-
sions the courts prior to Lines have dealt with vacation pay as if the
only question were an interpretation of 70a(5). After the Supreme
Court's Segal decision, a new emphasis was placed on the bankruptcy
court's equity powers. It is evident that the Ninth Circuit made extensive
use of this power in deciding Lines. By doing so, they not only
avoided a semantic snare that has entrapped previous courts, but reas-
serted the role of equity in bankruptcy matters and gave full effect to
the mandate of the Supreme Court in Segal.56
Lee A. Chilcote*
55. Id.
56. In Lines v. Frederick, 91 S. Ct. 113 (1970), the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and in a three page per curiam opinion affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. In
resolving the conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit, the Court did little more
than reiterate what had been said in Segal and the Ninth Circuit's opinion. However,
the decision clearly supports the thesis that the Supreme Court has given renewed em-
phasis to the role of equity in bankruptcy matters, for as the Court points out: "The
most important of the considerations limiting the breadth of the definition of property
lies in the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to give the debtor 'a new opportunity
in life."' Id. at 114. Justice Harlan dissented in a brief three-paragraph opinion
which is reminiscent of the reasoning of cases prior to Segal. The inference from Har-
lan's dissent is that he would decide the case on the transferability of the pay rather
than the equitable matter of whether the bankrupt was deprived of a fresh start. This
was the practice in prior cases such as Kolb, Keuther and Cohen, but apparently
Justice Harlan saw no difficulty in sorting through the semantic differences.
* Member, Second Year Class
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